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This essay seeks to draw attention to the near invisibility of forms of subjective epistemology 
that include motivation, emotion, and intentionality within organizational research, 
particularly within accounts of practice.  Although organisational researchers within the 
‘practice tradition’ have achieved much to date in revealing apparently fixed, immutable 
organisational forms to be processes that are emergent and thus contestable, such accounts 
often stop at discussing the way in which such conflicts are played out at the level of the 
individual. 
 
This is an arguably important omission, that can result in an incomplete, depersonalised 
analysis that engages well with physical and social dimensions of organizational life, but 
which remains mute about the human impact, or morality, of such ‘sociomaterial’ interaction, 
since our descriptions of the emergent interaction between organisations and organisational 
artefacts - between social and physical agency - rarely comment on the significance of such 
interaction for human beings. 
 
In particular, it is argued that ‘sociomaterial’ approaches to organisational practice (e.g. 
Orlikowski 2007) represent an exclusive duality between social and material agency in which 
individual agency is often conflated with social agency, on the basis that although in theory 
people ‘could do otherwise’, they tend to choose instead to replicate pre-existing routines.  In 
their tendency to take social agency as ‘shorthand’ for personal agency, ‘sociomaterial’ 
approaches downplay the myriad opportunities available to individuals to challenge or subvert 
existing practices. 
 
In response, the essay proposes that organisational researchers recognise a ‘triality’ of 
physical, social, and personal components to practice, focusing in particular on the way in 
which these fuse together in the reflexive intentionality of motivated people.  Building on this 
insight, the essay calls for a much closer integration of traditional sociological accounts of 
social generation that involve notions of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, with social psychological 
accounts of personal generation involving notions of subjective and objective, and builds an 
initial framework for linking the two fields of enquiry at the level of practice.  Arguing for an 
explicit, broad recognition of the subjective within epistemology is not, of course, such a new 
idea: in particular, Popper (1994) outlined three ‘worlds': the world of (material) things, the 
world of subjective (personal) perceptions, and the world of abstract objective (social) 
knowledge. 
 
But how is this subjective component of practice best conceptualised?  Drawing on Turner 
(1999), it is argued that individual agency is explainable only with reference to shared social 
context, and yet is not explainable solely in these terms, since practice also contains a large 
tacit element: social rules (context) are necessary for practice, but practice is not reducible to 
social rules alone.  The essay argues that although tacit knowledge (e.g. Blackler 1995) forms 
a large component of this subjective component, so too, following Pickering (1993) does 
human intentionality.  In this way, it is possible to talk of ‘nonhuman agency’ comprising 
both social and technical artefacts, as well as the intentionality of ‘human agency’ directing 
itself at various interests in relation to this, all three – social, technical, and personal – finding 
expression only through practice, all three emerging independently from the encounter. 
 
If practice is the ‘engine’ of social constitution, and subjective intentionality is a key input 
and output of this generative process, then it is arguable that discussions of practice need to 
start to direct the same sort of attention to the personal as to the social and physical – to all 
three of Popper’s worlds.  However, to do so arguably requires a ‘rebalancing’ of traditional 
macro-level sociological accounts of structure and agency involving popular theoretical 
frameworks that focus on sociality, such as Giddens’ structuration (1984) or actor-network 
theory (e.g. Callon 1986), with a greater acknowledgement of (social) psychological accounts 
of the interrelationship between subjective and objective, focusing on person-ality.  The essay 
uses the example of Giddens’ structuration theory to illustrate the potential danger of 
sociological predominance in accounts of practice, drawing on Willmott (1986) to argue that 
Giddens’ neat duality of structure and agency, whose agency is primarily peoples’ enactment 
of social routines, offers an inadequate account of subjectivity, since it rests in turn upon a 
dualism of self-other in which insecure selves, wholly disconnected from the other, strive to 
stave off ontological anxiety; and thus is the role of individual agency underplayed. 
 
In contrast, Barnes (2001) argues that system persistence – the enactment of social rules – is 
much better explained because people are ‘mutually susceptible’; their actions are always 
framed and considered in terms of how they will be socially perceived.  In this view, there is 
an indistinct line between Self and Other, where people are motivated to do the ongoing work 
required to continually update their understandings of rules in order to enhance others’ 
perceptions of them.  In this way the dualities of subjective/objective and structure/agency 
come together in practice, as physical, social, and personal ‘structures’ combine together in 
the agency of reflexive, intentional people. 
 
Having argued that people are socially motivated, thus establishing the underpinnings of the 
interrelationship between the personal and the social in reflexive intentionality, the paper then 
attempts to sketch an explanation for its mechanics: how actual intentions may be formed and 
modified within our reflexive, mutually susceptible condition – and thus how the nature of 
our practice is shaped.  In particular, Margaret Archer’s (2000)’s extensive discussion of 
practice outlines the workings of peoples’ reflexive ‘internal conversations’ – a continual self-
monitoring in relation to our goals, our emotional reactions to this self-perception, and the 
often complex compromises that we may make as a result.  It is suggested that Archer’s 
writings in this regard may offer a potentially fruitful framework for further research. 
 
Finally, the essay acknowledges that if studies of organisational practice need arguably to 
engage more fully with aspects of being, then dealing with the invisible is likely to present 
considerable empirical challenges.  In particular, a described by Goffman (1959), it appears 
that the emergent Self may deploy various identities in relation to different social and material 
constraints – but also that, in contrast to Goffman, recent ethnographers of personhood do not 
distinguish so easily between ‘selves’ and their various deployed identities, which co-evolve 
over time.  There is therefore significant further work required if researchers of organising are 
to reintegrate personality into accounts of practice, and to move a concern with the role of the 
subjective in social generation out of the wings and into centre stage. 
